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Violence is something with which we feel utterly familiar. We know what it 
is, even though we may not have experienced it at first hand. That is 
especially the case in the ‘extreme violence’ generated during the French 
religious conflicts of the reformation period. The desecration of religious 
objects was conjoined by dehumanising inter-personal physical aggression 
in incidents that we have no hesitation in delineating as ‘violent’. But any 
historical enquiry of the subject must begin by emphasising that violence is 
a ‘nomenthesis’, i.e. a non-normative categorization – a cultural construct, 
independent of genetic, social or gendered determinants. Violence is a 
means by which one individual or group constructs a hostile identity of 
another in order to render them anti-social, alien and barbaric. Even the 
valencies of the word differ in the vernaculars that we use. In English, for 
example, ‘violence’ carries overwhelmingly the sense of physical aggression, 
of one person displaying violent behaviour towards another. In French, on 
the other hand, it has the additional nuance of someone exerting pressure 
on another in order to secure their compliance. For Montaigne, for 
example, an innovation within the established order could be a ‘violence’; so 
too could the verbal upbraiding of a pupil by a schoolmaster.1 He regarded 
violence as a counterpart to (physical) force and cruelty, the expression of 
ungoverned appetites and disordered human passions.2 Because violence is 
a cultural construct, it therefore has to be understood in the context of the 
‘dynamic’ of the events that generate it. In that dynamic, there are three 
groups of participants: witnesses, victims, and perpetrators.3 It is, however, 
fundamental to the cultural construction of violence that the relationship 
between these groups and the violence adduced is asymmetric. That is to 
say, it is identified by some participants and refuted by others. Violence is 
the word used by victims and witnesses of an act of aggression, and not by 
its performers. The latter seek to exculpate themselves from the charge of 
 
1 Michel de Montaigne, Les Essais, ed. Pierre Villey et V-L. Saulnier (re-edition in one volume 
of the original three volume edition 1924) (Paris 2004) 122 and 389. 
2 Montaigne, Les Essais, 165, 580, 616, 646, 857, 859 and 1007. 
3 I have benefited in the argument of this article at various points from reading David Riches 
ed., The anthropology of violence (Oxford 1986) especially the editor’s introduction. 




violence, justifying their actions by a variety of strategies. These claims and 
counter-claims lie within the performance of the events themselves. It is the 
dynamic of violence which is the central issue to be explained and 
understood; and, in that explanation, the relationship between witnesses, 
victims and perpetrators plays a central role. 
 
 
The recent historiography of religious violence in the French civil 
wars 
 
Religious violence has come to be seen as the central distinctive cultural and 
social feature of the French ‘wars of religion’, the complex and politically 
convoluted period of French history traditionally defined by the unexpected 
death of Henri II in a royal tournament in June 1559 on the one hand, and 
by the pacification at Nantes in April 1598 on the other. That is partly the 
result of a remarkable article, published in 1973 by the American historian 
Natalie Zemon Davis.4 Entitled ‘The rites of violence. Religious riots in 
sixteenth-century France’ it has done much to change the parameters with 
which we view the subject. Davis focused on the grim, bizarre, terrifying 
episodes of popular religious violence in the French wars of religion. The 
documentation had always been there, but it offended (and still offends) 
liberal sensibilities. Some of the descriptions of individual brutality and 
collective carnage are undeniably gruesome. And there are questions to be 
asked about what constitutes the appropriate degree of objectivity towards 
such evidence, just as there are about the descriptions which abound of 
more recent ethnic cleansing in the Balkans or terrorist outrage in the 
Middle East.5 
Historians have a habit of ignoring the evidence that they cannot 
make sense of; and in the case of the violence of the French wars of 
religion, these episodes seemed senseless and sad. Natalie Zemon Davis 
offered, for the first time, an explanatory framework for them. She 
explained how the participants in these events used a pre-existent 
                                                 
4 Natalie Zemon Davis, ‘The rites of violence. Religious riots in sixteenth-century France’, 
Past and present 59 (1973) 51-91; reprinted in Natalie Zemon Davis, Society and culture in early 
modern France (Stanford 1975) 152-188. 
5 The issues of ‘scientific neutrality’ and ‘critical distance’ in relation to the phenomena of 
extreme violence and massacre is raised in an article, reflecting on a 1999 Paris colloquium 
on the subject by Jacques Sémelin, ‘In consideration of massacres’, Journal of genocide research 3-
3 (2001) 377-389. 




vocabulary of ritualised, popular violence, ‘rites’ which gave shape, form 
and explanatory power to what was happening. All violence is, in some 
sense or another, ‘predetermined’. In these instances, the ‘predetermination’ 
was religion, viewed as a cultural vocabulary. The cultural vocabulary was, 
she argued, different as between the parties involved in incidents of 
religious violence. There was a difference between the ‘ritual massacral 
space’ afforded by the traditional religion on the one hand, and the relative 
paucity of objectives for ritual attack, destruction or derision afforded by 
the reformed religion on the other. She cites the Histoire ecclésiastique as 
asserting that ‘those of the Reformed Religion made war only on images 
and altars, which do not bleed, while those of the Roman religion spilled 
blood with every kind of cruelty’.6 As she put it, ‘when all this is said, the 
iconoclastic Calvinist crowds still come out as the champions in the 
destruction of religious property’ whilst ‘in bloodshed, the Catholics are the 
champions’. In this respect, she was repeating a familiar Protestant 
justification for their attacks on religious images and cultic objects: ‘images 
and altars do not bleed’.7  
Natalie Zemon Davis’ article highlighted a tautology: that the wars of 
religion were about religion.8 They were not a cloak by which social groups 
dressed up their aspirations. They were not the vehicle for expressing social 
or economic grievances, even though both emerged in due course and as a 
result of the prolonged hostilities, and to an extent that we have almost 
certainly understated.9 They were not merely the tragic outcome of the 
‘triple whammy’ that afflicted the French monarchy at more or less the 
same time in 1559-1562: undeclared bankruptcy, royal minority, and 
aristocratic factionalism. Religion – not in the sense of a set of 
confessionally determined beliefs, but in the sense of the ‘sacred’ (as 
opposed to the ‘profane’) – lay at the centre of the conflict. Her explanatory 
framework had coherence because it rested upon the insights of social 
theorists, especially Emile Durkheim and cultural anthropologists, especially 
                                                 
6 Davis, Society and culture, 173. 
7 E.g. [Jean de Serres], Histoire des choses memorables avenves en France, depuis l'an M.D.XLVII. 
iusques au commencement de l'an M.D.XCVII. (n.p., n.p. 1599) 208. 
8 Highlighted by the review article by Mack P. Holt, ‘Putting religion back into the wars of 
religion’, French historical studies 18-2 (1993) 524-251. 
9 And emphasised in Henry Heller, Iron and blood. Civil Wars in sixteenth-century France 
(Montreal 1991). 




Mary Douglas.10 But it was a coherence which lacked much by way of a 
dynamic framework. It explained a phenomenon in terms of its cultural 
meaning, rather than in terms of a process. Chronology played little part in 
it.  
In subsequent discussions, historians have readily agreed with Natalie 
Zemon Davis that religion provides a framework of explanation for the 
religious violence of the period. But they have disagreed about how that 
framework works. Natalie Zemon Davis’ explanation was in terms of 
religion equalling ‘cultural meaning’. Since culture is concerned in part with 
symbols and meanings, violence is explained by the ‘religious meaning’ of 
objects (buildings, texts, books, clothes, parts of the body, people…) and 
behaviour (ways of expressing approval and disapproval, laughing with and 
against, sacralising and desacralising…). The difficulty with an explanation 
dependant on religion as cultural meaning is that it conflates the question 
whether the violence is being manifested in religious terms, or whether it is 
being caused by religion.11 It is a question of what kind of explanation we are 
being offered. And the question becomes still more delicate when one 
considers that what constitutes ‘religion’ was itself the subject of change in 
the sixteenth century. That introduces into the equation a dynamic which 
has been used by other historians to help to ‘explain’ the violence in the 
French context. One way in which historians have understood that change 
has been inspired by John Bossy’s encapsulation of it. Catholics tended to 
see religion as a ‘body of believers’, a worshipping community, invested 
with meaning by historic place, by its structural role within a traditional 
world order.12 Describing Paris on the eve of the wars of religion in terms 
of its ‘fabric’ of catholic processional rituals, Barbara Diefendorf describes 
the city as ‘the body social, the body politic, and the body of Christ (…) so 
closely intertwined as to be inseparable’.13 Explaining the significance of the 
famous ‘Affair of the Placards’ of 1534, Mack Holt emphasises the social 
implications of an attack on the sacramental character of the mass, an attack 
                                                 
10 In particular, Emile Durkheim, Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (Paris 1912); and Mary 
Douglas, Purity and danger. An analysis of the concepts of pollution and taboo (New York 1966). The 
influence of the latter upon her writing at this time is confirmed in Natalie Zemon Davis, 
L’histoire tout feu tout flamme. Entretiens avec Denis Crouzet (Paris 2004) 69-70.  
11 The point is made in the context of the violence of the French Revolution period by 
Claude Langlois, ‘De la violence religieuse’, French historical studies 21-1 (1998) 113-123. 
12 John Bossy, Christianity and the West (Oxford 1985) 170-171. 
13 Barbara Diefendorf, Beneath the cross. Catholics and Huguenots in sixteenth-century Paris (New 
York and Oxford 1991) 48. 




not simply on the cultural meaning of the mass but on its functioning, 
structural reality as a focus of communal reconciliation and social 
embodiment.14 Protestants, by contrast, evolved into seeing religion as a 
‘body of beliefs’, a ‘credal community’ that did not necessarily map onto any 
pre-existent social entity. The Protestant social entity laid claim to meaning 
and relevance to its adherents with reference to God’s word and the activity 
of God’s providence in the world. That body of beliefs created a different 
sense of community, disjoined from the past, a new Jerusalem with a 
stronger sense of social discipline – all components of a distinctive 
structural solidity. The violence of the French civil wars becomes a 
confrontation between two different ways of understanding belief. This 
explanatory pattern has the advantage of being a dynamic explanation, 
dependant on religion as cultural structure rather than cultural meaning.15 A 
cultural structure is one in which coherent patterns of culture have causal 
social significance – as Max Weber argued almost a century ago – an 
underlying cultural ‘logic’ in which events parallel one another and play out 
in dramas at different times and places, but with similar plots, creating a 
cultural phenomenon that we are justified in regarding as an ideal type (in 
this instance: ‘religious violence’). 
The search for an underlying cultural ‘logic’ to religious violence in 
the French wars of religion led Denis Crouzet to the thesis underlying his 
remarkable two-volume work: Les Guerriers de Dieu (The Warriors of God), 
published in 1990.16 In this work, Crouzet argued that religious violence 
must be viewed as the expression of a deep apocalyptic anxiety in French 
culture, a collective fear of the end of the world that had developed decades 
before the violence actually manifested itself.17 He started by exploring the 
mental world of ‘traditional’ catholic France, locating the notion that the 
world would shortly come to an end in a structure of belief in which holy 
power was immanent, engaged mystically and prophetically in a struggle 
                                                 
14 Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629. New approaches to European history 
(Cambridge 1995) 19-20. 
15 I draw the distinction from John R. Hall, ‘Cultural meanings and cultural structures in 
historical explanation’ History and theory 39-3 (2000) 331-347; and implicitly, too, from John R. 
Hall, Philip D. Schuyler and Sylvaine Trinh, Apocalypse observed. Religious movements and violence in 
North America, Europe and Japan (New York 2000). 
16 Denis Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu. La violence au temps des troubles de religion vers 1525 - vers 
1610, 2 vols. (Paris 1990). 
17 For a summary in English of Couzet’s arguments, see M. Greengrass, ‘The psychology of 
religious violence’, French history 5 (1991) 467-74. 




against the forces of darkness. Looking back to the period before the 
Protestant reformation – to around 1480 – he identified a renewed concern 
(to the point of collective obsession) with divine judgement and the Last 
Days. It was expressed in non-political and political modes and ran in self-
sustaining cycles in which preachers and the new printing medium acted as 
critical points in the spiral. We may take a rough analogy to the process 
which he envisages in the heightened fear of crime in many contemporary 
western societies (despite the fact that the crime statistics suggest that the 
reality does not justify the apprehensions), fears which are fed and 
channelled by tabloid journalism and media sensationalism and lead to 
greater criminalization with, as a consequences, a greater level of crime. The 
analogy has to be adapted though, because people were conditioned to 
think of themselves as under, and responsible for, God’s judgement. Judicial 
astrology, popularised in printed almanacs and prognostications, miracle 
pamphlets and prodigy literature, published sermons and speeches 
advertising the cosmic significance of the Turkish menace, the Black Arts of 
witchcraft and necromancy, the advent of syphilis in Europe provided 
exempla for which the only appropriate response was abject penitence (the 
contemporary antonym of ‘extreme violence’). The coming of the new 
Protestant heresy was simply a summative fear, a fear embracing all fears. 
They were the false prophets of the Apocalypse, prophets whom God 
commanded must be destroyed in the end time. Through it, this ‘conscience 
eschatalogique’ was mobilised by a ‘littérature panique’, exemplified for 
Crouzet by the writings of the excitable Parisian preachers and publicists 
like Artus Désiré, François le Picart, and Pierre Dyvolé. The result was a 
violence that was unchained by an inescapable logic, an inextricable fear, a 
violence which liberated people from their fears in events, where they 
transgressed normal boundaries of social behaviour because they were 
behaving like puppets, God having sanctioned them to be his ministering 
angels.  
This was one ‘logic’, one way of explaining the violence. But 
Crouzet’s account has also to take into account the rise of Calvinist 
Protestantism in reformation France. He provides one which contains 
another impulsive logic, leading to another, distinctive form of violence. 
Calvin offered anxious believers a release from their fears by creating a new 
sense of a providential order. Calvin rejected judicial astrology, 
prognostication, divination and millenarianism. His belief system was 
fundamentally different. Holy power was not immanent in the world, 
fighting with the forces of darkness. World order came from the laws of 




nature, imposed by God the Curator, dictating a Providence which 
predestined its history and our salvation in ways that we could not hope to, 
and did not need to, comprehend. Calvinist theology provided a 
‘désangoissement’ from the spiral of anxiety which affected France in the 
sixteenth century. Its violence was ‘human’, ‘rationalistic’ and ‘cool’. It 
attacked images because Calvinists did not accept the semiotics of Catholic 
holy power. This iconoclasm spread towards other aspects of power too. 
Preachers were interrupted during sermons, clergy mocked in the streets, 
catholic processions held up to ridicule. The Roman church was portrayed 
as a world of ‘fools’, ‘dogs, ‘beasts’, ‘ravening wolves’ etc. Parody, carnival, 
charivari were harnessed by Protestants to desacralise the traditional religion 
and liberate people from its ruses. The priests were the inevitable victims, 
and the gruesome rituals of their suffering took on the gestures and images 
appropriate to the mocking of their animal lusts before the people. 
Crouzet’s thesis is a tour de force; an attempt at an explanation of a 
phenomenon of religious violence which measures up to the phenomenon, 
and takes account of the internal dynamics behind it. His understanding of 
Protestant iconoclasm has been substantiated by the detailed investigations 
of Olivier Christin.18 But how much has, in reality, been explained? If the 
underlying tensions that he identifies in the culture of France on the eve of 
the Reformation had the effects he ascribes, it is implausible that similar 
tensions did not exist elsewhere in Europe. And, indeed, they can all be 
readily documented from similar evidence elsewhere, including those places 
where the reformation had a very divisive impact. So the question becomes 
whether, within French culture, there was not some particular mechanism 
by which such tensions were highlighted. Perhaps, as Julian Woltjer has 
recently suggested, there were institutional social ‘triggers’ to violence in the 
French case that did not exist, for example, in the Netherlands.19 There were 
social tensions in the violence of the French wars of religion, and they are 
not simply the consequences of the civil wars. They go back before the wars 
– to urban factionalism and the dispute over who paid taille in the case of 
Dauphiné for example, matters which were reflected eventually in the case 
of the Carnival at Romans that turned very nasty in 1580, to the suppression 
of the Vaudois and a nobility that came back from Italy determined to 
                                                 
18 Olivier Christin, Une révolution symbolique. L’iconoclasme huguenot et la reconstruction catholique 
(Paris 1991). 
19 Jan J. Woltjer, ‘Violence during the wars of religion in France and the Netherlands. A 
comparison’, Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis, 76-1 (1996) 26-45. 




blame someone and change things in the case of Provence on the eve of the 
civil wars, to a deep-seated anti-seigneurialism in the south-west in the case 
of the famous and much-advertised assassination of the baron de Fumel in 
the south-west, again on the eve of the civil wars.20 Woltjer may be correct 
to suggest that one of the key differences between the Dutch and French 
context for religious violence in this period lay in the greater adaptability of 
the Dutch urban environment, its magistrates with great authority to 
mediate conflicts before they grew out of hand. Equally, it is also possible 
that there was something distinctive about the ‘dangerous vocation’ of 
French catholic preachers and the popular reactions to what they said, 
wrote and printed.21 A detailed study of the surviving sermons of one for 
whom the evidence is most plentiful – Pierre le Picart – suggests that his 
undoubted popularity came from his being banished from Paris for 
seditious preaching in 1534, for some scarcely-veiled and sensational attacks 
on those at the French court who were known to favour the new ideas, and 
for his commitment to the reform of the church, rather than his 
eschatological or millenarian views.22 Perhaps, as Luc Racaut suggests in an 
important recent study, it was more the power of focusing traditional 
stereotypes of the alien ‘other’ in society upon the Protestants, a process 
that involved lay and clerical input alike, that was more important than the 
eschatological dimensions emphasised by Crouzet.23 And, when it comes to 
the mobilising power of the printing press, we have to take into account the 
significant fact that the numbers of sermons being printed in France were in 
considerable decline in the years from 1530 to 1560, in comparison to the 
                                                 
20 See Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Le Carnaval de Romans. De la chandeleur au mercredi des 
Cendres, 1579-1580 (Paris 1979); for Provence, see Jan J. Woltjer, ‘Violence during the wars’; 
for the baron de Fumel, the recent thèse d’habilitation at the University of Paris-1 of 
Professor Serge Brunet (December 2003) provides important evidence to place the affair in 
the anti-seigneurial conflicts of the region.  
21 The term is taken from Larissa Taylor, ‘Dangerous vocations. Preaching in France in the 
late Middle Ages and Reformation’ in: Larissa Taylor ed., Preachers and people in the reformations 
and early-modern period (Brill 2001) 91-124. 
22 Larissa Juliet Taylor, Heresy and orthodoxy in sixteenth-century Paris. François le Picart and the 
beginnings of the Catholic Reformation (Brill 1999). 
23 Luc Racaut, Hatred in print. Catholic propaganda and Protestant identity during the French wars of 
religion (Aldershot 2002); cf. Luc Racaut, ‘Religious polemic and Huguenot self-perception 
and identity, 1554-1619’ in: Raymond A. Mentzer and Andrew Spicer eds., Society and culture in 
the Huguenot world, 1559-1685 (Cambridge 2002) 29-43. 




tens of thousands in the years before.24 Only the analysis of the surviving 
imprints from French presses for the years from 1559-1600, currently being 
undertaken at the French Book Project under the direction of Andrew 
Pettegree, will begin to assist us in seeing whether the patterns of 
publication among the impressive production from catholic presses in those 
years give us any clues as to what was creating a spiral of violence in France 
that did not exist in, for example, the Netherlands in the 1560s. 
 
 
Witnesses, victims and perpetrators 
 
To investigate the dynamic further, we must examine a sequence of events 
more closely. Let us take the week of religious violence that overwhelmed 
the small town of Senlis to the north of Paris in June 1562. What happened 
in Senlis generally did not hit the headlines. It was a walled town of under 
10.000 inhabitants in the old Capetian heartlands that prided itself on its 
loyalty and consensual politics. And, by the standards of what happened in 
many French cities in 1562, what went on in Senlis was small beer: that is 
why it is worth studying. Our main witness is the Histoire ecclésiastique des 
églises réformées de France, published in Geneva in 1580. Generally catalogued 
under the name of Théodore de Bèze, it was really a collaborative work, 
constructed from testimonies collected over twenty years from the French 
Protestant churches, and probably compiled by Simon Goulart.25 Goulart 
had been born in Senlis in 1543. Although he moved away from the town 
and emigrated to Geneva in 1566, never to return, he always signed himself 
‘Simon Goulart, Senlisien’ and kept in touch with events there through his 
brother Jean.26 He was probably well-informed on events there. 
It was on the evening of 21 June that the violence began. Civil 
hostilities had started on a national scale just over two months earlier. Senlis 
had a Protestant community in its walls. They had founded a church – albeit 
rather late in the day in 1559-1560. Tension between the catholic and 
                                                 
24 See Larissa Taylor, ‘Out of print. The decline of Catholic printed sermons in France, 1530-
1560’ in: Robin Barnes et al, Books have their own destinies. Essays in honor of Robert V. Schnucker 
(Kirksville, Miss. 1998) 121-129. 
25 G. Baum and Ed. Cunitz eds., Histoire ecclésiastique des églises réformées du Royaume de France, 
(facsimile reprint of Nieuwkoop, B. de Grauf, 1974 ed. 3 vols.) (Paris 1883-1889) vol. 2, 425-
431 for events in Senlis. 
26 Leonard Chester Jones, Simon Goulart. Sa vie et son oeuvre, 1543-1628 (Geneva and Paris 
1917) 2-11. 




Protestant communities had been evident in the preceding two months, 
especially as a result of the billeting of troops in the town. Its leading 
Protestants felt that they had been singled out unfairly in the quartering of 
the cavalry company. On midsummer’s evening at about 10.00 pm, the 
town watch was patrolling the streets. During an altercation in a narrow 
alley, one of the volunteer guards, a merchant from a well-respected Senlis 
family (his brother was a canon of the cathedral) Pierre Du Mesnil was 
accidentally killed, possibly by another member of the watch, none too used 
to a pistol. His fellow guards, however, thought that the shot had come 
from a window onto the alley where a young cleric called Nicolas Gosset 
lodged in the house of his brother-in-law, François Suard. Enraged, they 
forced the door of the house, massacred Suard and his wife, and took 
Gosset prisoner. The following day, the whole town was up in arms on the 
rumour that the Protestants were somehow behind the affair and that ‘they 
had taken up arms to kill everyone’. Protestant notables were rounded up, 
taken from their houses and imprisoned, some escaping as best they could. 
In the remainder of the Histoire ecclésiastique account, the emphasis is placed 
on the activities of the catholic aldermen governors of the town, Claude 
Stocq and Guillaume Bertaut [var.: Berthaud]. They manipulated a 
commission of two judges from the Parliament of Paris (Nicole Favier and 
Jean de Thérouanne), both with ‘form’ when it came to judging heretics.27 
The result were 25 show trials of noted Protestant prisoners by the 
Parliament (the lieutenant particulier of the royal court in Senlis, Jehan Greffin 
being one of the victims, alongside Antoine ‘Trippier’ [in reality, Antoine 
Crappier], a schoolmaster, and Jehan Goujon, originally a weaver, the 
Protestant preacher). The Histoire ecclésiastique account (followed in almost 
every detail by the later editions of Jean Crespin’s Histoire des Martyrs) makes 
a good deal of these Senlis ‘martyrs’, dwelling in particular on the death of 
the latter.28 Judged at the Parliament in Paris on 21 November, he was 
transported back to Senlis where he was condemned to be hanged and 
burned. His constancy and knowledge of the Scriptures apparently 
impressed his judges in Paris; but back in Senlis, some of the crowd were 
                                                 
27 Both were lay judges with plenty of experience of the judicial repression of Protestantism 
in the 1550s, Favier having been nominated to the Parliament in 1550 and Thérouanne in 
1555. See Edouard Maugis, Histoire du Parlement de Paris de l'avènement des rois Valois à la mort 
d'Henri IV, 2 vols. (Paris 1914) vol. 3, 201 and 206. Cf. William Monter, Judging the French 
reformation. Heresy trials by sixteenth-century Parlements (Cambridge 1999). 
28 Jean Crespin, Histoire des martyrs persecvtez et mis a mort pour la verité de l'Euangile, depuis le temps 
des Apostres iusques à present (Geneva 1608) fol. 581r-581v. 




sufficiently incensed by the leniency of the sentences meted out to the 
Protestants that they insisted the hangman cut poor Goujon down from the 
gibbet so that he burned in the flames below as a ‘real’ heretic should. 
Goujon duly played his role on the stage of martyrdom, rising above the 
flames up to three times to declare: ‘Lord, have mercy on me’. Goulart, a 
great collector of evidence of God’s ‘providence’ at work in the world, 
noted also with keen interest that the presiding judge at Goujon’s trial 
(Gilles le Maistre) died that same night, petrified (so he said) at the prospect 
of the Protestants seizing Paris and having himself hanged instead.29 
What can this account tell us about the dynamics of violence at 
Senlis? What does it leave out? It presents Senlis’ religious violence as the 
result of a cynical exploitation of an incident which had nothing to do with 
the sectarian conflict at all (there being no proof that any of the individuals 
involved in the unfortunate death of Du Mesnil were Protestants) for 
personal gain and political ambition. It points the finger firmly in the 
direction of the ‘insatiable avarice’ of Stocq and Berthaud, out to exploit the 
tensions created by the civil wars for their own private gain. Had they not, 
says the Histoire ecclésiastique account, seized the city possessions of the 
Protestant-inclined grain merchant, Nicolas de Cornouailles, who took 
flight when the troubles started? Did they not have their eye on the wealth 
of the ‘opulent’ Pierre Henneguye and Constantin Bedeau, who were among 
the prisoners sent for questioning to Paris?30 Had they not, adds the Crespin 
continuator, had at their beck and call an ‘utterly profane man by the name 
of Pierre le Chien, the captain of a troop of brigands [in Senlis] known as 
the Band of the rue de Paris’?31 The Protestants by contrast were the injured 
innocents, local civilians caught up in a maelstrom of events beyond their 
control, involuntary martyrs in God’s cause. 
Our difficulty is that, as so often, at this distance from the events, it 
is hard to penetrate this surface texture to discover the forces really at work 
in Senlis. What, to be precise, do we know about Stocq and Berthaud? Here, 
we have the benefit of an excellent recent doctoral thesis by Thierry 
Amalou who has examined all the surviving local evidence.32 Like his father 
François, Claude Stocq was a grain merchant. He apparently handled the 
                                                 
29 Histoire ecclésiastique, vol. 2, 242. 
30 Ibidem, 429 and 431. 
31 Crespin, Histoire de matyrs. 
32 Thierry Amalou. Loyalisme monarchique et consensus urbain. Senlis devant les désordres religieux, 2 
vols., Thèse de doctorat d'histoire, Université de Paris-I (Panthéon-Sorbonne) 2003. This 
work will be published in due course. 




granary of one of the local abbeys. A good catholic, he founded a Mass in 
honour of his parents on 14 March 1555. He was elected aldermen (échevin) 
in 1560 and saw his mandate extended exceptionally because of the troubles 
in July 1562 (which is actually the date when Berthaud also became an 
alderman too), and then again in July 1563. Together they were energetic to 
the point of obsession in the discharge of their civic duties, extending their 
authority over and above that expected of them in a place which had little 
by way of a rooted and independent civic tradition. They certainly used the 
week of violence to arrest Protestant-inclined senior members of the local 
law-court (bailliage) and send them to Paris for trial. They sought to 
maximise the fiscal benefits to the town of the trials that were instigated in 
their wake. They were probably over-zealous, too, in raising the portion of 
the forced loan imposed on Senlis to pay for the urgent costs of the royal 
armies in the emerging civil war. 
But Stocq and Berthaud can also be seen in another light. Although 
the town’s civic traditions were not strong, the elected échevins had 
undeniable responsibilities for the security and protection of the local 
community of Senlis. Such responsibilities were particular important in the 
circumstances of declared hostilities, a civil war, in which Protestant troops 
were mustering to the north of Paris, threatening the capital and its outlying 
protecting flank of towns, of which Senlis was one. As elsewhere in France, 
however, the legal magistrates of the local royal court, nominated officials 
of the présidial court, had, in recent generations, refused to serve as 
aldermen, regarding such an office as increasingly beneath them. Stocq and 
Berthaud doubtless regarded the local magistracy as ‘lax’ in their attitude to 
heresy. Prominent members of the court were leading Huguenots – Jehan 
Greffin, the lieutenant particulier and Antoine Parent, a conseiller in the présidial 
court were known to have preached and led prayers before the arrival of a 
minister in the town. Others – the lieutenant-général of the court, Philippe 
Loisel in particular – judiciously hedged their bets. And, after the edict of 
Romorantin in May 1560, the machinery for the local legal prosecution of 
heresy had been largely paralysed. The local aldermen therefore had to act 
to preserve the integrity of the town in their absence. They had additional 
encouragement from elsewhere. The town was close to the ancestral lands 
of the Montmorency family at nearby Chantilly and Ecouen. The duke of 
Montmorency had often intervened in the past in town elections to 
‘recommend’ a particular candidate. In the delicate political climate of the 
quasi-minority of the young king François II (1559-1560) and then the real 
minority of his successor, Charles IX (1560-1574), Montmorency had an 




important role as Constable, titular head of the French army. He made no 
secret of his support for the traditional religion and encouraged his political 
allies and those in his affinity to act robustly in is defence too. His cavalry 
company had been despatched to Senlis on 12 April 1562. The maréchal des 
logis saw to it that the company was discriminatorily garrisoned on 
prominent Protestants in the city. The gens d’ordonances may not have been 
given explicit orders, but they knew the general steer. The gens d’armes 
maltreated their hosts and hostesses (one of the latter was so severely 
battered by a cavalryman’s sword she later died of her wounds) and saw to 
it that the newly constructed Huguenot temple was completely ransacked. 
‘Brûle-Bancs’ (‘Bench-Burner’) was how the no-nonsense militarism of the 
Constable became known to the Protestants. Without giving Stocq and 
Berthaud any explicit orders, the catholic aldermen of Senlis no doubt 
‘understood’ their role in Senlis as ‘outriders’ for the Constable, carrying out 
his implicit instructions and protected by his authority.  
Stocq and Berthaud had good reasons, too, to be concerned about 
the fate of Senlis. Not far away lay the town of Meaux, the foyer of French 
Protestantism from its earliest days. It was there, too, that the earliest signs 
of an organised community of heretics in France had emerged in 1546. The 
discovery had led to a gruesome auto-da-fé (‘le bûcher des quatorze’) and 
the development of a bitter, underground Protestant martyr culture. That 
community emerged from the shadows in around 1560 to become one of 
the centres of iconoclasm in northern France, culminating in a wave of 
destruction on 25 June 1562, when the cathedral church and abbey of Saint-
Faron were ransacked and its clerical population set upon. The news of 
what was happening in Meaux arrived that same day in Senlis, acting in the 
same way as news and rumour from elsewhere in France did within the 
town, heightening the alarm and urgency among its local catholic defenders 
and contributing to the atmosphere behind the religious violence of those 
weeks.  
One further element stands out from the Senlis case-study. The first 
is the absence of any catholic preacher in the town inciting the local 
populace to violence. If anything, the reverse was the case. The most 
notable clerical figure in Senlis was the Sorbonne-trained theologian 
(théologal) attached to the cathedral, Martin Martimbos. He had been a rector 
of the university of Paris and, like several of his distinguished predecessors, 
he was a controversial figure. To the author of the Histoire ecclésiastique 
account, he was a nicodemite, advocating an evangelical Christianity and 
lending out his copy of Calvin’s Institutes to those who fancied reading it, but 




unwilling to commit himself openly to Protestantism ‘like a candle that gave 
light to others but remained in the shadow itself’.33 In the eyes of René le 
Roullier bishop of Senlis he risked scandal and worse. The bishop invited 
the Paris Faculty of Theology to investigate Martimbos’ preaching and 
beliefs in 1555. After an investigation lasting two years (the surviving 
evidence of which documents richly the heterodox attitudes of Senlis’ 
theologian and their reception locally) he was eventually censured publicly 
in 1557 and the affair rumbled on to 1559. Given the associated evidence of 
a gathering lay mistrust of its clergy in Senlis, it is not difficult to postulate 
that it was the vulnerability and divisions amongst its clergy, rather than 
their stridency, which lay behind the militancy of Stocq and Berthaud. 
 
 
The potency of religious violence 
 
How should we explain the potency of religious violence in the civil wars? 
We can do so in terms of cultural structure – examining the ‘rites’ of 
violence as evidence for the ‘pollution’ which was implicit in the appearance 
of a new belief structure in the midst of communities, challenging 
communal senses of identity and meaning. We can also do so in terms of 
cultural meaning – investigating the underlying cultural logic in religious 
confrontation and the emerging eschatological anxieties that resulted. But 
we should not forget the underlying ‘potency’ in all violence, whether 
religiously motivated or not. That potency arises from the political climate 
of violent interaction, in which one side inevitably perceives itself as the 
injured party and the other as the just pursuivant, each seeking to ‘subvert’ 
and ‘pre-empt’ the explanations for what happened offered by the other 
party. In these essential contested claims lies the potency of the religious 
violence of the period. 
 
                                                 
33 Cited Amalou, Loyalisme monarchique, 83; cf. Thierry Wanegffelen, Ni Rome ni Genève. Des 
fidèles entre deux chaires en France au XVIe siècle (Paris 1997) 75-77. 
